lian units were drilling with wooden mockups of rifles in August 1942) before MacArthur's people could set up his planned defensive bases on the north coast of eastern Papua, the Japanese Army had moved in and taken both north-coast villages he'd targeted for bases as reinforcements and war materials finally began to trickle in from the States in July� Buna and Gona� several weeks before the forces and transports his staff was organizing could have reached them in strength�at a time when Japan's Navy and Air forces were dominant every where they chose to go. The good news was some of those allocated forces were already forward at Milne Bay, where he was setting a trap with the veteran mid-East blooded 7th Australian Division, for he fully expected the Japanese would continue trans-coastal landings in an attempt to out flank Port Moresby, bringing ground forces in and around the point, in an end-around past the eastern tip of New Guinea and land on undefended beaches there. Once established, under cover from their air bases in the Solomon Sea they would be easy to resupply and hard to dislodge, and they could march overland to Port Moresby without negotiating mountains along the coast�in effect, the army would end up with terrain suitable for bombers to dominate the Coral Sea as they'd intended in landing in May when assaulting amphibiously from the Coral Sea. Buna and Gona were their last successes in the New Guinea Campaign, for MacArthur's trap at the Battle of Milne Bay resulted in a see-saw battle that in the end had the Japanese abandon their beachhead and retreat for the first time in the war. The Japanese then attempted to take the city by land over the Kokoda Track staging from Buna and Gona.
As Supreme Allied Commander of the South West Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur had after months of arguments with that victory, finally convinced Australian politicians in early August 1942 to "defend Australia by defending Port Moresby"�a forward defense
